Outside the box: WAR replacing traditional stats

Here's a post I wrote a couple weeks ago, my second for USA Today Sports Weekly.

In this one, without actually trying to explain what WAR is, since that was done previously by one of my colleagues, I try to show how useful it is in comparing players with entirely different skill sets.

I hope I succeeded.

ERA+ Shows True Value of Pitchers

Thanks to my status as a contributor at High Heat Stats, I was lucky enough to get to write this short article for USA Today Sports Weekly, which also appears in the May 22-28 print issue.

Of course, like many baseball fans of a certain age, I subscribed to this publication for quite some time, especially when it was called USA Today Baseball Weekly from 1991-2002. Needless to say, I'm pretty pleased to see my byline in a magazine I've long been a fan of.

I Learned About Sabermetrics Playing Strat-O-Matic

I began playing Strat-O-Matic in the late '70s. My next-door neighbor and I started with the football board, dice and cards game, but quickly added Strat-O-Matic Baseball to our arsenal. We even dabbled with Strat-O-Matic Basketball a bit, but it didn't take long to realize it was a little boring.

Strat-O-Matic Football was fun, but baseball was definitely where it was at. Not because it involved a great deal of strategy—other than setting lineups and making pitching changes, it's mostly about the luck of the dice—but because baseball is, and has always been, about statistics.

The statistics some of emphasize have changed over the years, but they've always been a huge part of any serious fan's enjoyment of the game. Obviously, the kind of kid who got into a game like Strat-O-Matic was also the type who didn't mind digging into the numbers in an attempt to determine who was worthy of playing time and who wasn't.

It didn't take long for us to start figuring out the probabilities of each roll of the dice. It's pretty simple math, really. By determining, when rolling two dice, there are six possible ways to roll a seven, five ways to roll a six and eight, four for a five and nine, etc., we were able to determine the percentage chances of each outcome.

Eventually, my standard practice became to write each batter's total hit chances, on-base chances and home run chances versus both right-handed and left-handed pitchers directly on the card. Of course, I similarly evaluated each pitcher against each type of batter. I did this all in pencil, of course, which seemed like a good idea in theory. But, as you can probably imagine, eventually those numbers gave way to smudge marks.

Still, writing those numbers on the cards, and realizing a player with 54 on-base chances has only a 50% chance of making an out if the roll refers to his card* influenced me to emphasize on-base percentage and power. For some reason, when you're the one rolling the dice for each play, the value of avoiding outs becomes more obvious than usual. And, of course, what's better than a home run? Right, a home run with runners on base.

*When rolling two dice, there are 36 different potential rolls (6 times 6). A third die is also rolled, which determines which of six colums to refer to. 1-3 are on the batter's card, 4-6 on the pitcher's card. Remember how I said there were six possible ways to roll a seven? That would count as six total chances. 36 chances per column times three columns on the player's card equals 108. Now, of course, you see that 54 is exactly half of 108.

So, long before I had ever heard of Bill James, it was Strat-O-Matic Baseball that introduced me to the world of advanced statistics. Sort of. OK, not really advanced statistics, but we all know OBP was essentially the gateway to OPS+, wOBA, WAR and some even more advance sabermetric statistics.

After my initial purchase of the most current set of cards that came with the game, I developed an interest in the old-timers sets. I'm not sure why, except I'm pretty sure it was less jarring to my sensibilities to make what sometimes seemed like unorthodox personnel decisions with players I wasn't all that familiar with.

1956 was one of the first old-timers sets available, and when I bought it I had no idea how interested in some of those older players I would become. OK, well I will admit one of the catalysts for said interest involved a lot of drinking while in college.

I'll explain. One of my college roommates and I played a 162-game series between the '56 Reds and '56 Tigers, which we called the Busch Drinking Series.** Yeah, I know 162 is an even number, so in reality it was a 163-game series, since if it ended in a tie, we would have had to play the extra game. But, we wanted it to be the equivalent of a full season of games, although I'm not really sure why we played 162 instead of 154.

**The Busch Drinking Series, I would be embarrassed to admit if I wasn't in college at the time, was named after the 16 oz. cans of Budweiser's cheaper—but not necessarily inferior—cousin we drank while playing a drinking game which revolved around the "on-field" outcomes.

The defensive manager drank a sip of beer for each total base (one for single, two for double, etc.), walk, HBP, stolen base and run scored by the offensive team. I think he even had to drink when his team committed an error. The offensive manager drank once for each out his team made. Some simple math will tell you a grand slam meant eight sips, or about half of a 16 oz. beer. Needless to say, the drinks added up, especially considering we chose two strong offensive teams with mediocre—at best—pitching, and it was kind of an unwritten rule you never started a player for his defense if it meant sacrificing offense in the process.

What does the drinking series have to do with sabermetrics? Not much, really. But, a couple of those '56 Tigers players—the team I managed to a somewhat dubious 76-86 record—were among the prime examples of hitters who seemed much better to me than I would have otherwise thought.

Earl Torgeson was a .264 hitter with above average power, above average speed, and average defensive skills at first base. Not much to write home about, right? Except for the fact he walked 78 times in exactly 400 plate appearances, for a .406 OBP. Despite the fact he wasn't a base-stealer, he instantly screamed leadoff hitter to me.

Now, I must admit I don't necessarily deserve a lot of credit for looking past his lack of base-stealing ability to make him my leadoff hitter. Harvey Kuenn led the team with a grand total of nine stolen bases. But, Kuenn's .332 batting average better fit the bill—by the standards of those days—despite the fact his .387 OBP was almost 20 points lower, so in real life, he batted primarily at the top of the order.

Torgeson was a platoon player, but when he played, he mostly hit second. Since he had only one sacrifice hit that year, this probably means Detroit had the right idea with the way he was used. He simply was another guy at the top of the order who had the ability to get on base in front of Charlie Maxwell, Al Kaline and Ray Boone. But, I still thought it would make more sense to swap the two in the order, to have the higher OBP guy batting in front of the better run producer (Kuenn out-slugged Torgeson .470 to .425).

Another player on that team whose ability to draw a walk enhanced my desire to over-use him, somewhat unrealistically, was a catcher named Bob "Red" Wilson. Also a platoon player in real life, Wilson got the bulk of his playing time versus left-handed pitching, with Frank House being the other half of the platoon.

Wilson hit .289 with a .393 OBP and a .452 slugging percentage in 1956, and he was equally as good vs. RHP as he was vs. LHP. Of course, the batting average and slugging percentage only hint of a pretty good offensive player, but it was the OBP that made him stand out. So, despite the fact he wasn't quite as good as House defensively, he was an easy choice as my full-time backstop.

I guess the point of this all is to say playing Strat-O-Matic taught me to appreciate players who I might not have otherwise thought very highly of. Sure, I learned "a walk's as good as a hit" back when I was an eight-year old playing organized baseball for the first time. But, somehow those words never rang true. Even at such a young age, I knew, in most cases, a hit was actually better than a walk. As I got a little older, I realized those adults who were saying that really just thought of a walk as a consolation prize for kids who had difficulty reaching base otherwise.

What most of those adults probably never realized was they were making a case for why the ability to draw a walk is such an under-appreciated skill. Of course, when the pitchers are so young, we're probably talking more about their lack of ability than the batter's eye for the strike zone.

But, what I didn't realize was so important until playing Strat-O-Matic taught it to me many years later, is a walk accomplishes two really important things: it puts a runner on base—with the exception of a home run, a runner has to reach base before he can score—and it avoids an out (you only get a finite number of those).

It's a pretty simple concept, really. And, let's not let our judgment be clouded by what we've always thought to be true, the ability to draw a walk at competitive levels is a skill, perhaps even a talent. Dare I say, but maybe—in the discussion of what's often referred to as the five tools of a ballplayer—it's about time the ability to hit for average be replaced by the ability to get on base.

Anyway, what reminded me of this is that I recently signed on to "absentee-manage" the '58 Tigers in Jeff Polman's Mysteryball '58 Strat-O-Matic replay and murder mystery blog. Unfortunately, Torgeson has since been traded to the White Sox, but Wilson, Kuenn, Maxwell, Kaline and Boone—for a couple months, at least—remain. Still, it's a much weaker offensive team than the '56 version, partly because Maxwell is a shell of his former self, Boone's now a platoon first-baseman rather than a third-baseman (and on his way out), and Kuenn's offensive contributions come from center field instead of shortstop.

But, my excitement about this particular project, while it initially had to do with my minor involvement in it, is now more a product of my interest in the tale that Jeff will be telling via new entries to the blog three times a week. Let's just say he had me at "Tough to make out a dead body when it’s covered in peanut shells and Royal Crown Cola," the opening line to the story's first entry, "Unsafe at Home."

Only three posts have been written so far, so there's not much catching up to do if you're a fan of baseball murder mysteries, or if that concept intrigues you as much as it does me. I can almost guarantee you won't be disappointed. Just don't get your hopes up for my Tigers.

Cooperstown Class of 2012

The Baseball Bloggers Alliance (BBA) recently announced—for what it's worth to the Baseball Writers Association of America (BBWAA)—its recommendations for the Hall of Fame Class of 2012.

With 84.25% and 78.77% of the vote, respectively, of the 148 member blogs—including this one—that participated, Barry Larkin and Jeff Bagwell received the BBA's endorsement.

I voted for Larkin, Bagwell, Tim Raines, Alan Trammell, Edgar Martinez and Larry Walker. Walker is the only one of the six who I did not vote for last year, although I admitted then I needed to take a closer look at him. I since have come to the realization he is worthy of becoming the first member of the Colorado Rockies in the Hall of Fame.

Despite the anti-Coors Field bias working against him, his park-adjusted offensive numbers (140 OPS+, 142 wRC+)* are comparable to deserving Hall of Famers such as Reggie Jackson, Harmon Killebrew, and Duke Snider. Admittedly, he did so over fewer plate appearances than Jackson and Killebrew, but the value-based metrics—mainly WAR*—rate him comparable to Snider, a notch below Jackson, but a notch above Killebrew.

The main reason he compares so favorably to these and other existing Hall of Famers: defensive value. Walker ranks just shy of the top 20 all-time in defensive WAR, among players whose primary position was outfield, a fact which is reinforced by his seven Gold Gloves. Now, many folks—including myself—are a little skeptical about defensive metrics, as well as Gold Glove awards, but when one backs up the other, it's pretty safe to say they're a true indicator of a player's defensive ability.

The thing about great all-around players like Walker—who also was a good base runner—is, since he didn't have that one exceptional skill—i.e. he wasn't as good a hitter as Killebrew and Jackson, but he surely was better at every other phase of the game—people tend to write them off as not quite Hall of Fame worthy. The same applies to guys like Raines, Larkin and Trammell as well. But, in my opinion, those people are wrong.

As I did last year, I declined to vote for Mark McGwire and Rafael Palmeiro based on my still-evolving philosophy regarding PEDs and the Hall of Fame. Although, admittedly, not without its flaws, I wrote about my thoughts on that subject here two years ago. I've actually begun to re-think my position, though, and I may be writing about this in the weeks to come. If you want to criticize me for taking six years to make up my mind, or for being indecisive, so be it. Besides, mine is just a make-believe vote anyway.

For now, though, I'm going to focus on taking a look at whether or not the BBA's vote is a predictor of next week's announcement of the official BBWAA results.

It seems everyone is under the assumption Larkin will be the only player elected by the writers this year. Last year, he received 70.78% of the BBA vote. This year, his support jumped to 84.25%, a 19% increase. If his 62.1% 2011 BBWAA vote total increases at the same rate, that will leave him at 73.9%, just shy of the 75% needed for induction. Unfortunately, I have a sneaky suspicion that's just what's going to happen. He'll fall somewhere in the 72-74% range and have to wait until the crowded 2013 ballot to see if he can get over the hump.

Bagwell's BBA total is up, from 62.34% in 2011, to 78.77% in 2012, a 26.4% increase. I'm not sure if there are BBA voters with the same ridiculous first-year ballot bias as some of those in the BBWAA, but this could explain such a big jump. Even at that rate, this would only get him to 52.9% in the official balloting, compared to last year's 41.7%. So, I don't think Bagwell's going to get in this year either.

Jack Morris and Lee Smith received 53.5% and 45.3%, respectively, of the official vote last year. Since the BBA is more SABRmetrically inclined than the BBWAA, I don't think the BBA's voting provides much of a indicator of these guys' chances.

Smith has been stagnating in the mid-40s for four years now, and I don't see his candidacy receiving a boost in support. Personally, I think—and hope—Morris's candidacy has plateaued as well. Last year's total was only slightly higher than the year before. I see him getting to 55% this year, and holding off Bagwell for the distinction of second highest vote-getter, but I predict he'll become one of the rare candidates to reach the 50% voting mark, but never make the Hall of Fame.

Bernie Williams is the only first-ballot candidate worthy of consideration. But, despite a very good career that ended a little prematurely, Bernie falls short of Cooperstown-worthy, in my eyes and likely in the eyes of the voters. He'll get the requisite 5% of the vote to stick around for at least another year, though, but with all the candidates being added to the ballot in the next few years, he'll end up nothing but an afterthought.

So, there you have it. My prediction that the only speech we'll be hearing at the Clark Sports Center this summer will be that of Ron Santo's wife.

* Since I don't use the advanced metrics on a regular basis here, I figured I should explain:

• OPS+ is park and league-adjusted on-base plus slugging percentage. 100 is average. Greater than 100 is above average, less than 100 below average.
• wRC+ is park and league-adjusted weighted runs created, an improved version of Bill James's runs created statistic. It's comparable to OPS+ in terms of scale (i.e. 100 is average).
• WAR, of course, is Wins Above Replacement, the SABRmetric community's attempt to establish an all-encompassing statistic that measure a player's overall value to his team.

Most Productive Offensive Players in Baseball History

I thought it would be interesting to try and determine the most productive offensive players in baseball history, and to use advanced statistical analysis for this purpose.

I decided to base this particular analysis on the metric I'm most familiar with, Wins Above Replacement (WAR). But, since this is supposed to be about offense, I needed to look at just the offensive components of WAR.

WAR is comprised of seven different categories, only five of which are relevant here:

• Runs from Batting
• Runs from Baserunning
• Runs from Reached on Error
• Runs from Grounded into Double Plays
• Runs from Fielding
• Runs from Positional Scarcity
• Runs from Replacement Level

All of these numbers are added together to get Runs Above Replacement (RAR), which is then converted to Wins Above Replacement (WAR). Roughly, ten runs equal one win. That is, for every ten runs someone is better than a replacement player, he contributes one additional win to his team's success.

Basically, I took each player's Runs Above Replacement and subtracted his Runs from Fielding and Runs from Positional Scarcity. The latter statistic is based on the concept that, if a team were to get the exact same production out of its catcher as from its first baseman, the catcher would be far more valuable. This makes sense, but I'm looking to determine overall offensive production, not value.

Lastly, since I'm talking about who was(is) the most productive, I decided to rank the players on a per plate appearance basis. So, let's cut right to the chase and present the 50 most productive offensive players in baseball history, among those with a minimum of 6,000 career plate appearances, based on position-independent offensive RAR per plate appearance:

1. Babe Ruth
2. Lou Gehrig
3. Ted Williams
4. Barry Bonds
5. Dan Brouthers
6. Mickey Mantle
7. Ty Cobb
8. Albert Pujols
9. Rogers Hornsby
10. Joe Jackson
11. Billy Hamilton
12. Jimmie Foxx
13. Joe DiMaggio
14. Ed Delahanty
15. Willie Mays
16. Tris Speaker
17. Stan Musial
18. Frank Thomas
19. Hank Greenberg
20. Mark McGwire
21. Hank Aaron
22. Johnny Mize
23. Mel Ott
24. Alex Rodriguez
25. Frank Robinson
26. Roger Connor
27. Dick Allen
28. Manny Ramirez
29. Jeff Bagwell
30. Sam Thompson
31. Edgar Martinez
32. Eddie Collins
33. Harry Heilmann
34. Honus Wagner
35. Jim Thome
36. Elmer Flick
37. Jason Giambi
38. Cap Anson
39. Jesse Burkett
40. Eddie Mathews
41. Nap Lajoie
42. Ralph Kiner
43. Rickey Henderson
44. Mike Schmidt
45. Duke Snider
46. Chipper Jones
47. Joe Morgan
48. Willie McCovey
49. Gary Sheffield
50. Lance Berkman

If you're interested in the actual numbers, you can view the spreadsheet here.

A few observations:

• Obviously, this is a rate stat, so it favors players with short or incomplete careers. It will be interesting to see if Albert Pujols can sustain his top ten ranking over the remainder of his career.
• Among the top eight, none of them peaked in the same decade.  This may be an indication of this particular metric's effectiveness at adjusting for era. Obviously, taken at face value, Dan Brouthers's numbers can't possibly compare to Bonds's. Bonds hit over 650 more home runs than Brouthers, had a higher on-base percentage and twice as many stolen bases, yet Brouthers—who played in the power-deficient 19th century—lands right behind him on the list.
• The list seems fairly representative of all eras, including 19th century and modern players, with 10 beginning their careers prior to 1900, and 14 having played at least part of their careers in the 21st century.
• Other than the 19th century players, who most people aren't as familiar with, I'd say the list comes pretty close to reinforcing our pre-conceived notions about how these players stack up against each other. Obviously, different people will have differing opinions, but by how much? Do any of these rankings seem significantly out of whack?

I'm certainly not trying to say we should all accept that this is the way we should evaluate players. But, at the same time, there's really no way to compare players who played in entirely different eras without using statistics that are era-adjusted. Statistics such as Wins Above Replacement, and its components, provide us with an excellent starting point for being able to make such comparisons.

Expansion Era Hall of Fame Ballot

Unfortunately, I have to say that I don't think a single player on the Expansion Era Hall of Fame Ballot is worthy of induction. In my opinion, Ted Simmons comes the closest, but is still not quite worthy, and I'd love to say that I think Ron Guidry is deserving of the honor, but I can't.

I've heard the arguments for Dave Concepcion, but frankly, I have no reservations in saying that he ranks 8th out of the eight players nominated: Tommy John, Simmons, Rusty Staub, Guidry, Vida Blue, Al Oliver, Steve Garvey, Concepcion.

Speaking of nominations, I'd be curious to know who decided that these particular eight players should be the ones up for election. A more deserving group would include Bobby Bonds, Darrell Evans, Bobby Grich, Keith Hernandez, Thurman Munson, Graig Nettles and Luis Tiant. In fact, I would vote for Grich and Hernandez if their names were on the ballot...and if I had a vote.

The player evaluation system that I referred to a couple posts ago is still in the works. Actually, I used it to make my decisions on the players in question here, but it's still subject to tweaking.

I'm not going to go into great detail right now, but my system is based on the following statistics:

• Wins Above Replacement (30%)
• Win Shares (30%)
• ERA+ or OPS+ (15%)
• Bill James's Hall of Fame Standards Test (15%)
• Bill James's Black Ink Test (5%)
• Bill James's Gray Ink Test (5%)

Each statistic for each player is weighted as noted above and compared to a base value, which represents that of a borderline Hall of Famer. These base values will take some time to finalize, but the idea is that a composite score of 100 will constitute a Hall of Fame level career. In fact, using the system as it currently stands, Hernandez and Grich would rate 99.31 and 97.99, respectively, leaving them just short of the baseline threshold, but close enough to consider. By comparison, Concepcion's rating is 65.14.

In addition to the eight players on the ballot, there are four non-players whose candidacies are being voted on tomorrow. For the record, I would vote for George Steinbrenner and Marvin Miller, but pass on Billy Martin and Pat Gillick. Martin is probably as deserving as Whitey Herzog, so I wouldn't object to his election, but I'm not convinced that Herzog really belongs, so I'm not going to advocate for Martin based on that comparison.

Regardless, tomorrow is the beginning of an exciting part of the baseball off-season. One month later, we'll find out the results of the writers' vote, and hopefully, in the very least, we'll be welcoming Bert Blyleven, Roberto Alomar and Jeff Bagwell into Cooperstown.

Is Roy Halladay Overrated?

How could I suggest such a thing?

While I'm not trying to imply that Roy Halladay isn't as good as everyone thinks, when it comes to the recent National League Cy Young voting, I do have a bit of a beef.

My complaint is not that Halladay's season was undeserving of the award. Rather, it's with the way in which he won it. That is, unanimously.

What I don't completely understand is how all 32 voters considered him the top choice when there was another candidate who was equally deserving by most measures, and even more deserving by others. That candidate is Adam Wainwright.

Of course I'm not going to make such a statement without backing it up. So, let's start by looking at the mainstream statistics, the three categories commonly considered the Triple Crown of pitching.

• W-L record: Halladay 21-10, Wainwright 20-11
• ERA: Wainwright - 2.42, Halladay - 2.44
• Strikeouts: Halladay - 219, Wainwright - 213

Pretty even, right? Halladay's six-strikeout edge and slightly better won-lost record, while playing for a team that won 7% more of its games than Wainwright's, certainly isn't justification for the wide margin by which he won the award.

So, let's take a slightly deeper look. Halladay is lauded for his 7.30 K/BB ratio, and compared to Wainwright's 3.80, this appears to be a pretty big edge, on the surface. But, taking a closer look, Wainwright actually averaged 8.32 strikeouts per nine innings to Halladay's 7.86. So, obviously this means Wainwright had a considerably higher walk rate (2.18 to 1.08). However, Halladay made up for this by giving up more hits than Wainwright.

In fact, looking at opponents' batting statistics versus each pitcher, Halladay yielded a higher batting average (.245 to .224), which effectively canceled out Wainwright's higher walk rate, as evidenced by their almost identical opponents' on-base percentages (Wainwright - .274, Halladay - .271). But, Halladay not only got hit harder, he also gave up considerably more home runs (24 to 15). This gives Wainwright a considerable edge in opponents' slugging percentage (.330 to .373) and OPS (.604 to .645).

Let's dig a little further and look at a few SABRmetric statistics. I'm providing simplistic explanations regarding each, rather than attempting to explain how each is calculated, which would be quite difficult.

• ERC (Component ERA) measures a pitcher's ERA based on the hits and walks he allowed, rather than actual runs: Wainwright - 2.38, Halladay - 2.69
• DIPS ERA (Defense-Independent ERA) attempts to measure a pitcher's ERA independent of the defense behind him: Wainwright - 2.97, Halladay - 3.09
• ERA+ is park-adjusted and league-adjusted ERA, expressed as a percentage relative to the average pitcher: Halladay - 165 (65% better than average), Wainwright - 161

As you can see, Wainwright outshines Halladay in two of three SABRmetric measures that attempt to normalize a pitcher's ERA, one of them by a pretty wide margin.

So, where does Halladay have a clear advantage over Wainwright? Well, he pitched more innings (250 2/3 to 230 1/3), and threw more complete games (9 to 5) and more shutouts (4 to 2). His other considerable edge is in the fact that he's Roy Halladay.

Is he overrated? Well, not really. But, did he receive preferential treatment in this year's Cy Young voting due to his reputation? Quite possibly, yes. Did he have a season that was deserving of the award? Of course, but Adam Wainwright was just as, if not more, deserving and how he managed to earn zero first-place votes is a question I can't possibly answer.

Rock 'n the Hall

With the latest Hall of Fame vote coming up on Monday, despite the fact that there are a number of borderline names on the ballot, I've been thinking a lot about the candidacy of one particular player. Unfortunately, the player in question received only 24.3% of the vote last year, in his first year of eligibility. In fact, he received only one-third the amount of support as another player, who happened to play the same position that he did, and who is much less deserving of the honor. But, I'm not going to get into comparing these two players. If you're interested, you can read about that here. I just want to make the case for the guy I feel is the second most deserving candidate on this year's ballot.

Rickey Henderson, of course, is the most deserving player. Should I waste any time, or space here, explaining why? Probably not, so I'll let the numbers do the talking: 1406 SB (1st all-time), 2295 runs (1st), 2190 BB (2nd), 3055 hits, .401 OBP, 127 OPS+, 535 win shares (400 means absolute HOF enshrinement, according to Bill James).

Tim Raines, while maybe not a first-ballot Hall of Famer, should be fairly obvious as well. In the '80s, he was the National League's version of Henderson. That is, the best leadoff hitter in his respective league. He was not quite as good as Rickey, of course, but that's certainly no insult. He had an OBP of .390 or better, which ranked in the top six in the NL, in seven seasons in that decade. Also in the '80s, he ranked first or second in runs scored four times (six times in the top ten), and in the top four in stolen bases eight times, including leading the league for four consecutive years from 1981 to 1984. He also ranked in the top three in runs created for five consecutive years (1983 to 1987).

Raines had an excellent prime, but there was a bit of a drop-off after he left Montreal. Still, although his base stealing ability declined quickly from his early to mid-30s, he remained a good offensive player with a high OBP and decent power. He also played a significant part-time role for two World Series teams in his late 30s, and accumulated 390 win shares over the course of his career. I said earlier that Bill James, the creator of win shares, has stated that 400 is the plateau for automatic enshrinement in Cooperstown. James has also called 300 the level at which a player is more likely than not to enter the Hall of Fame. The last ten position players to be inducted have averaged 377, from Kirby Puckett's 281 to Eddie Murray's 437, with Wade Boggs (394) and Tony Gwynn (398) achieving the closest totals to Raines' 390.

Raines also had a career OBP of .385, an OPS+ (park/league adjusted OPS) of 123 (23% better than average), and is 5th on the career stolen bases list with 808, at an outstanding success rate of 84.7%, which ranks first all-time. By comparison, Rickey Henderson was successful 80.8% of the time, and Lou Brock's rate was 75.3%. In fact, although caught stealing statistics only existed for the second half of Ty Cobb's career, it's extremely likely that Raines would rank second all-time in stolen bases minus caught stealing (Henderson - 1071, Raines - 662, Brock - 631). It seems more than obvious to me that this should be considered a more important statistic than merely stolen bases on their own.

Speaking of Brock, baseball-reference.com's similarity scores judge him to be the player whose career mostly closely compares to Raines'. Brock is not only a Hall of Famer, but he was elected on the first ballot. I'm a strong advocate that we should never argue that one player deserves to make it just because another undeserving player did. I'm not saying Brock is undeserving, but he is over-rated and has nothing on Raines, other than 130 stolen bases—which, of course, is more than offset by having been caught stealing 161 more times—and the fact that he reached the artificially magical milestone of 3000 hits.

Raines beats him in win shares (390 to 348), and tops him easily in OBP (.385 to .343), OPS+ (123 to 109) and runs created per 27 outs (6.6 to 5.2), while maintaining fairly comparable statistics in other more traditional cumulative categories (39 fewer runs, 80 more RBI, 21 more HR). Furthermore, Raines never won a Gold Glove, but he was an above average outfielder, and Brock was a surprisingly poor defender, making 10 or more errors in 12 different seasons. Yes, you're reading that correctly. He made 196 errors in 19 seasons, with a .959 fielding percentage, as an outfielder.

But, as I said, Brock's shortcomings should not be an argument for Raines' candidacy. However, I have no problem saying that Raines compares favorably with the two men considered to be the best speed-oriented leadoff hitters in the second half of the 20th century. In fact, if you asked me to rate them in order, I'd feel very confident rating Raines behind Henderson, but ahead of Brock. Therefore, Tim "Rock" Raines is, without question, a Hall of Famer.

National League MVP

Despite a bit of a slump during the season's stretch run, I'm sticking with my choice of Justin Morneau for AL MVP. Quoting something said to me by a friend of mine, who's a Red Sox fan, in an email conversation after having read "Making the Case for Morneau":

"...remember Ortiz, Youkilis, Lowell, and Drew have (all) been hurt at some point this year."

I contend that the fact that's even an issue backs up my point. That's how loaded this team is that they could afford to lose any one of those guys at any given time with minimal effect. This includes Pedroia. If he went down, the rest of those guys, and Jason Bay/Manny Ramirez (29 HR, 105 RBI, 105 R combined), would pick up the slack. Every one of those guys is better than anyone in the Twins' lineup, except Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau. Well, maybe Jason Kubel is about as good as Mike Lowell, but you get my point.

Enough said about that. It's time to move on to the other awards, starting with the National League MVP. This is a difficult one to pick, but the way I see it, it comes down to Ryan Howard or Albert Pujols. CC Sabathia's candidacy makes for an interesting debate, but I wouldn't give the MVP to a player who missed a half season due to injury, and for the same reason, I won't give the award to someone traded to his team at mid-season.

Ryan Howard had a great second-half, with 28 HR and 78 RBI in the season's final three months, and one could certainly argue that he carried his team in their run to catch the Mets in the NL East. So, I'm not going to worry about his low batting average (.251) and relatively low OPS (.882).

Albert Pujols' Cardinals ended the season four games out of the wild card spot, but they really didn't come quite that close, as there were two other teams between them and the Brewers. But, they remained a contender for much longer than anyone expected, and in my opinion, that leaves him in the mix of potential candidates. Pujols led the league in slugging, OPS, total bases, and the SABRmetric categories Adjusted OPS+, Runs Created, Adjusted Batting Runs, and Batting Wins, leading the last three categories by wide margins. I explained Adjusted OPS+ and Adjusted Batting Runs in the Morneau article, so I'll try to briefly describe the other two statistics here.

Runs Created is a runs estimator, similar to Adjusted Batting Runs, that assigns a positive value to outcomes like hits, walks, steals, home runs, etc. and negative values for outs, caught stealing and GIDP. Batting Wins attempts to measure the number of wins a player added relative to the league average hitter.

I'm going to go with Pujols here, based on his sheer statistical dominance and consistency, and the fact that he carried a team that most prognosticators didn't give a chance, especially after their staff ace, Chris Carpenter, went down with an injury that limited him to 15 1/3 IP for the year. They remained in contention for most of the season, and although they did slip a little near the end, they were a contender, and Pujols was inarguably the biggest reason for that. Based on these factors, he is my National League Most Valuable Player.

Making the Case for Morneau

Two years ago, I wrote about how the MVP is a joke, because it's come down to nothing but a debate over what the criteria for the award should be. Justin Morneau won the American League MVP that year, and I had no problem with that. But, I just felt that the award should go to the Most Valuable Player, with no disqualification because so-and-so's a pitcher and they have their own award, and no inconsistency where sometimes it simply goes to the player with the best numbers, without any consideration for how truly valuable he was.

That year, I also handed out Charles Simone's first "annual" Babe Ruth Awards to Albert Pujols in the NL and David Ortiz in the AL. Then, of course, I completely forgot about it and failed to honor anyone last year. So, as silly as this seems right now, I'll give Charles Simone's 2007 Babe Ruth Awards to Matt Holliday in the NL and Alex Rodriguez in the AL. I'll try to remember to announce this year's awards in a somewhat more timely fashion.

The title of this post, however, is about Justin Morneau's 2008 MVP candidacy. I've mentioned this a few times already, in this blog as well as a couple of comments I've made on Casey's Clipboard. I'm more convinced now than I've ever been that Morneau is hands-down the leading candidate for the American League's Most Valuable Player award. Let's take a look at my main arguments for this.

First, I'm a major advocate that the MVP should come from a team that was a playoff contender. There are some circumstances where I might consider making an exception, but none of those apply this year. So, I'll start with the fact that Morneau is tied for the AL lead in RBI with 124, and his co-leader, Josh Hamilton, plays for a Texas Rangers team that is 15 1/2 games out in the wild card race, and 19 1/2 games behind the West division leading "Los Angeles" Angels. Hamilton, also, has considerably cooled off since the all-star break, driving in just 29 runs in 51 games, while Morneau has produced 56 RBI in 54 games over the same time frame. Additionally, the next highest total by any player on a team within 10 games of sniffing the playoffs is Kevin Youkilis' 102, 22 fewer than Morneau's total.

Not that I need to, but let's take a closer look at the Morneau-Youkilis comparison. Obviously, having teammates who reach base is a very important factor in a player's RBI total. The Twins, as a team, are 5th in the American League with a .340 OBP, while the Red Sox lead the league in that category at .360. Taking this a step further, the three players who have most commonly batted in the 1-2-3 positions in the Twins order (i.e. in front of Morneau) are Carlos Gomez (.292 OBP), Alexi Casilla (.337) and Joe Mauer (.409). If you simply calculate the average of these three, it's .346, still considerably lower than the Red Sox team average. Not very scientific I realize, but I still think it supports my point that Morneau is producing big-time RBI numbers surrounded by a mediocre supporting cast.

While we're still on the subject of supporting cast, the hitters who have provided protection in the lineup for Morneau are no more impressive. Michael Cuddyer, the most common batter in the 5th spot in the order for Minnesota, has a slugging percentage of .377 and an OPS of .703, significantly below the league averages of .420 and .755, respectively. Jason Kubel, he of the second most at-bats in the spot behind Morneau, has slugged a solid .464 with a .805 OPS. Still, it's safe to say that the hybrid of these two players is an average American League hitter, hardly the type that is needed to ensure that opposing teams need to pitch to an offensive threat such as Morneau. The fact that Morneau is tied for the AL lead in intentional walks, with 15, backs up my point that he's not seeing as many good pitches to hit as other players with stronger lineup protection behind them, particularly those on loaded offensive teams.

But, obviously, I'm not making the case for Morneau based on just one statistical category. He's scored 92 runs, and his simplistic runs produced (HR + R - HR) total of 193 is tops in the league. He's also hitting .312 (7th in AL), with 44 2B (6th), a .386 OBP (6th) and a .526 slugging percentage (9th).

I think I've made a pretty good case that Morneau's RBI total is truly relevant. I've also addressed the opinion that RBI is an over-rated statistic by showing that he's racked up more than impressive numbers while at a slight disadvantage to players on more balanced offensive teams. However, it's when I dig further and look at the true SABRmetric categories, those that don't depend on the performance of teammates, that my case is really reinforced.

If I'm going to use SABRmetric statistics, they need to have park and league adjustments built in, and the two best categories that fit the bill are Adjusted OPS+ (On-Base Percentage plus Slugging Percentage, adjusted to account for park and league factors) and Adjusted Batting Runs (the number of runs the player's production contributed to above that of a league average player, also adjusted for park factor). Morneau is 5th in the league in Adjusted OPS+, with only players from non-contenders (Milton Bradley, Alex Rodriguez, Aubrey Huff) and Carlos Quentin of the White Sox ahead of him. I'll address the Morneau vs. Quentin comparison later.

Morneau looks even better when Adjusted Batting Runs is used. He trails only Milton Bradley and Alex Rodriguez there. Bradley, despite ranking first in both of these categories, not only plays for a sub-.500 Texas Rangers team, but just hasn't produced enough actual runs to warrant consideration (74 runs, 74 RBI). Rodriguez has had a good year, although he's been booed almost incessantly in New York based on the perception that he hasn't come through in the clutch this year. Regardless of whether or not that's fair, he just hasn't done enough for an underachieving Yankees team to be a candidate for MVP.

Check out baseball-reference.com's 2008 American League Expanded Leaderboards to take a look at the statistics I've referred to here. For a better explanation of what these statistics mean, see their Batting Stats Glossary.

Since I previously referred to my personal preference of giving the award only to players on teams that at least were in contention for the playoffs, I should take a look at the other leading candidates from each of those teams. I'm really only considering five teams here: the Tampa Bay Rays, Boston Red Sox, Chicago White Sox, Minnesota Twins and Los Angeles Angels. The Toronto Blue Jays and New York Yankees are the only other teams above .500, and while both teams were considered playoff contenders at times this season, the Blue Jays, given their late push for the postseason that appears to be coming up short, would be the only of those two for whom I'd consider a candidate. However, that candidate would have to be pretty exceptional, and while Roy Halladay has had an excellent year, I don't think it's been good enough to warrant serious consideration. The Yankees were major underachievers, so I would find it hard to justify any player on that team being considered most valuable.

So, that leaves the five contenders, one of which, the Twins or White Sox, will be left out of postseason action. But, that doesn't matter, as a team remaining in the race until the last half of September is a championship contender. During the stretch run, they're simply playing for the right to advance to the next round. Let's look at the candidates from each of these teams.

Tampa Bay is one of those teams from which it would be difficult to choose who has been their most valuable player, let alone the league's. Many have suggested that it's Evan Longoria, but he's just returned from missing an entire month, doesn't have enough at-bats to qualify for the lead in any of the average categories, and doesn't lead the team in any significant cumulative categories. James Shields is their most valuable pitcher, but he's hardly an MVP candidate.

For Chicago, Carlos Quentin was once considered the league's leading MVP candidate, but he's out for the final month of the season, and that's reason enough to eliminate him from consideration, especially for a team that is still fighting for a playoff spot. Jermaine Dye has had a very good season as well, but he's still overshadowed by Quentin on his own team. The pitching staff has been solid, but there are no exceptional performers there.

The Los Angeles Angels have the best record in the American League, and have had the easiest road to the playoffs, clinching the division title earlier than any AL West team in history. Their most valuable player would have to be Francisco Rodriguez, but, despite breaking the all-time single season saves record, his season is statistically inferior to several other AL closers, including Joe Nathan, Mariano Rivera, Joakim Soria and Jonathan Papelbon.

Among Morneau's own teammates, Joe Mauer has had a very good year (.322, 8 HR, 73 RBI), but his season pales in comparison to Morneau's. Joe Nathan has also been impressive, but a closer would have to be truly exceptional to earn my MVP vote, and Nathan comes up short of that distinction.

That leaves the Red Sox, and I saved them for last for a reason. They have who I consider to be the two most compelling candidates other than Morneau. The Boston media and fans have been trumpeting the candidacy of Dustin Pedroia of late, but it was just a few weeks ago that their man was Kevin Youkilis. Personally, I still think Youkilis is a stronger candidate, although it's hard to ignore the post-all star break numbers of Pedroia. I've already made the case for Morneau over Youkilis, though, and Morneau's second-half production compares favorably to Pedroia's. But, most importantly, the fact that the Red Sox have two strong candidates further supports my point that Morneau is easily more valuable to his team than either of those players, especially considering J.D. Drew was their first-half MVP.

With that, I rest my case, and welcome anyone to share their opinion with me on this subject, even if you disagree...in which case you'd be wrong.

To summarize my analysis of first-basemen, I rank these four as follows:

1. Tony Perez
2. Keith Hernandez
3. Don Mattingly
4. Steve Garvey

Perez is a Hall of Famer, but Hernandez, in my estimation, only falls a little short in comparison. The only reason I can surmise as to why Hernandez has received so little Hall of Fame support is due to his lack of power as a first-baseman. This idea that certain positions on the field need to provide certain offensive skills is a little ridiculous. The fact that Hernandez was a first-baseman should work against him only to the extent that he played the least important defensive position on the field.

Here's how they rank in the various categories we're looking at:

Career Win Shares
Perez - 349
Hernandez - 311
Garvey - 279
Mattingly - 263

Prime Win Shares
Perez - 309
Hernandez - 303
Mattingly - 256
Garvey - 252

Top 5 Seasons
Mattingly - 29.20
Perez - 28.80
Hernandez - 27.20
Garvey - 24.80

Per 162 Games
Hernandez - 24.13
Mattingly - 23.87
Perez - 20.36
Garvey - 19.38

Average Prime Season
Hernandez - 23.99
Perez - 22.69
Mattingly - 22.09
Garvey - 19.88

My first observation upon examining these lists is that Garvey clearly ranks last among these four. He places last in four of the five measures, and next to last by a relatively small margin in the fifth. I feel that this confirms my initial statement that Garvey is overrated, at least in comparison to Hernandez and Mattingly, whom he rates considerably higher than in the eyes of the Hall of Fame voters, but clearly should not.

My second observation is one that surprises me...that is, Hernandez outdistances Mattingly in four of the five measures, including both cumulative and two of the three rate categories. Mattingly does have a higher average, by two Win Shares, in his top 5 seasons, but I feel this is the least important of the three rate categories. Hernandez not only rates better than Mattingly for his entire career, but he actually rates better, by a very small margin, in Win Shares per 162 games, and by a more significant margin in Win Shares per average prime season. Based on this analysis, I have to rate Hernandez higher than Mattingly.

Comparing Perez and Hernandez is a little more difficult. Perez wins both cumulative categories, but by a close margin in prime Win Shares, possibly proving that Perez's value is over-inflated by his career extending further beyond his prime years. Hernandez ranks higher in two of the three rate categories, including the two most important...by a considerable margin in Win Shares per 162 games, and by a smaller margin in average prime season. However, Perez does rate higher in the top 5 seasons category, and this plus my own subjective element are the deciding factors in ranking Perez ahead of Hernandez.

Like I said on Jan 13th, Perez ranks 21st all-time in RBI, and no other player in this analysis can lay claim to any statistic nearly as impressive as that. I realize bringing this back is straying from my Win Shares analysis, but I'm basically looking for a tie-breaker and this is it, in addition to the fact that Perez was one of the central figures of one of the greatest teams of all time. Obviously, Joe Morgan, Johnny Bench, and Pete Rose, all Hall of Famers based on their playing careers (I'm not going to get off on a Rose tangent here), were more important to those Reds teams than Perez, but this doesn't make Perez much different from Phil Rizzuto. In fact, I think I could argue that Perez is more Hall of Fame worthy than Rizzuto, but that's another tangent, and it would probably piss my father off, so I'm not going to go there.

In his new book, The New Bill James Historical Abstract, James ranks the top 100 players in baseball history at each position. In the pages preceding the player rankings, he explains his ratings system, including a brief discussion of the limitation of using raw Win Shares as a player rating system. In addition to the player’s career Win Share total, James uses the player’s three best seasons, five best consecutive seasons, career Win Shares per 162 games, as well as a time line adjustment and a subjective element.

I’m not sure that I see the value in using the player’s three best seasons as an indication of his career value, although this would slightly favor Mattingly and Perez. Just as I don’t believe that the player with the greatest cumulative statistics should automatically be rated highest, I don’t feel that a few seasons of greatness should outweigh a career of consistency. I am going to use the five best consecutive seasons, however, as well as career Win Shares per 162 games, but I’m also adding two of my own measures.

While I understand that evaluating a player based on his career Win Shares per 162 games is intended to measure how truly valuable he is as a player (when he plays), and does not subject him to be discriminated against based on such factors as the decision of his manager whether or not to play him every day or to play him only 140 games per season (possibly to preserve his longevity). However, what this fails to take into consideration is that a player’s value is based on his contribution to winning games over the course of a championship season.

A player who plays 162 games at an equal level of performance to one who plays 140 games is, obviously, about 15% more valuable in that particular season. Therefore, what also must be considered is a player’s value per season over the portion of his career that he is a full-time player. Steve Garvey played a full season of 162 games in seven separate seasons over the course of his career. The other three players combined to do so only once (Mattingly, 1986). This fact must be taken into consideration to the extent that playing in additional games increases a player’s productivity. Obviously, the flip side is that the lack of rest may actually detract from his performance, but the statistics will bear this out.

Therefore, the first statistic that I’ve added in my analysis is the player’s average Win Shares per full-time season, with the one caveat being that it should count against a player if he wasn’t able to maintain a full-time job at least into his mid-30’s, barring unforeseen circumstances such as major injuries or, most obviously, premature death. Both Garvey and Perez continued as full-timers into their late-30’s, while Mattingly retired after playing his final full season at the age of 34, which I’ll consider acceptable. Hernandez, however, played his final full-time season in 1987 at the age of 33, a little early by my standards, so I’m going to throw his 1988 season, in which he played in only 95 games, into the mix. Incidentally, Mattingly played in only 102 games in 1990, and Garvey in only 100 games in 1983, seasons that were not strike-shortened, but are considered during their primes for the purposes of this analysis, so including 1988 should not severely damage Hernandez by comparison.

In this particular analysis, all four of these players’ careers consisted of between 12 and 14 full-time seasons, which certainly provides for ease of comparison. I did, however, have to make one adjustment due to the fact that each of these players’ prime years were affected by strike-shortened seasons: Perez in 1972; Perez, Garvey and Hernandez in 1981; and Mattingly in 1994 and 1995. To account for this, I made adjustments based on the extent that each of these seasons were abbreviated, thereby reducing Mattingly’s full-time seasons from 12 to 11.59, Hernandez’s from 13 to 12.63, Garvey’s from 13 to 12.68, and Perez’s from 14 to 13.62. As it turns out, this didn’t make much of a difference, as you can see that each of their season totals was reduced by 0.32 to 0.41 of a season. I was mildly surprised by this, but I guess I should have realized that Garvey and Hernandez, who were affected by only one such season, were, in fact, affected by the season that was cut short the most (1981).

The second additional statistic I’m using is Win Shares earned during “prime” seasons, thereby adding a second cumulative statistic to offset my otherwise greater emphasis on win share rate statistics. However, I also want to point out that, in the seasons that are not counted in each of these players primes, Perez played in a total of 679 games; almost twice as many as Garvey’s 355, more than three times as many as Hernandez’s 196, and almost seven times as many as Mattingly’s 98. I feel strongly that a player’s decision to continue to play beyond his prime, which accounts for 464 of the 679 games in the case of Perez, should not be a major factor in evaluating the relative merits of the careers of potential Hall of Famers. Therefore, the advantage of looking at Win Shares earned during prime seasons is that it places a greater value on a player whose prime lasts longer than normal, but does not reward a player who continues to accumulate Win Shares even though he is past his prime and, obviously, not performing at a Hall of Fame worthy level.

Next, I'll get to the actual numbers...that is, the comparison of Win Share rates and totals. Thanks for bearing with me.

Well, unfortunately I've been idle with my writing for over a week, but that doesn't mean that I haven't been working on my analysis. I've been looking at player evaluation methods for almost the past year now, including reading Bill James' magnum opus Win Shares, and I'm convinced that this is the most thorough player evaluation method available for several reasons.

First, it is the only method that breaks down total player contribution to his team's success by dividing "Win Shares" between pitchers, fielders, and batters in direct proportion to the number of games the team has won. The only other method, that I am aware of, that considers fielding is Pete Palmer's Linear Weights System.

Second, Win Shares is the only method that considers a player's ability to be good enough to earn major league playing time as a positive value. The Linear Weights System uses a zero value as its starting point, with each player's contribution measured as either a positive or a negative from this base point. In other words, a player who is good enough to earn considerable major league playing time, but is rated below average by this system, actually earns a negative value. On the other hand, a player who sits on the bench (i.e. doesn't play at all) remains at a zero value. In fact, Steve Garvey rates as -5.2 for his career. This is absolutely ridiculous. Even those of us that suspect, or are convinced, that Garvey is overrated would never even suggest that he was a below average player and that the composite value of his career was a negative. This would suggest that he actually hurt his team more than he helped it, which is a ludicrous notion.

Third, I am convinced that James' system does the most thorough job of building in adjustments for such contextual factors as the era in which a player performed, the contributions of the players on the teams for whom he played, the strength of the competition, and the ballparks in which he played. Linear Weights considers these factors, but I've already pointed out its major shortcoming for which I'll admit to being completely unforgiving. All other player evaluation methods are essentially offensive-oriented systems that express performance on a rate basis, and do not make these important contextual adjustments.

I probably should explain what I mean by "express performance on a rate basis". Batting average is the most basic example of a statistic that measures performance as a rate. There is no consideration given to the player's ability to accumulate statistics. In order to evaluate a player's career, or to compare the careers of several players, we must consider both types of statistics, rate stats and cumulative stats. By doing so, we assign value to both the player's overall ability to perform and his ability to earn playing time, a significant factor of which is his longevity.

There are many rating systems out there that have done an excellent job of expanding on the shortcomings of batting average as a way to evaluate players. OPS (on-base percentage plus slugging percentage) is a simple, but fairly effective, way to measure a player's overall offensive ability. Other much more complex methods have been developed, but they are all offensive rating systems that are only effective at measuring a player's ability in a given season, or across a few seasons, because they do not place any weight on cumulative statistics. They are not designed to do so, and, therefore, are not as relevant to evaluating a player's overall career as the Win Shares system is.

The next part of my analysis will be to compare these four players using the Win Shares system. Despite my endorsement of Win Shares as the ultimate player evaluation method, there still are several ways to use the system to compare players. I'm not just going to state that Tony Perez earned 349 career Win Shares to Keith Hernandez's 311, Steve Garvey's 279, and Don Mattingly's 263, and, therefore, Perez is the best, Hernandez the second best, etc. I'll compare them using a few Win Share rate statistics as well, although their cumulative Win Shares certainly will be taken into consideration as a major factor.

For more information on the Win Shares system, you'll have to locate a copy of Bill James' book, Win Shares. Unfortunately, it's already out of print, so you'll have to look for it at your public library or try to find a used copy on the Web. Pete Palmer's Linear Weights System is explained in detail in Total Baseball: The Official Encyclopedia of Major League Baseball. Other statistics, such as OPS, on-base percentage (OBP), and slugging percentage (SLG), are explained in detail in the Batting Stats Glossary at Baseball-Reference.com.

Since I ended my last post by bringing up the fielding situation, let's begin today by taking a look at how these four compare in that department. I'll start with a non-statistical discussion of their reputations as fielders.

Keith Hernandez is considered by many to be one of the greatest defensive first-baseman of all-time, having won 11 consecutive National League gold gloves from 1978-88. Don Mattingly's reputation is almost as great. In fact, he took over the throne as the most proficient at the position as Hernandez reached the latter part of his career. Mattingly won nine American League gold gloves in the ten year span from 1985-94, only losing out to Mark McGwire in an injury plaqued 1990 season.

Steve Garvey also was considered to be an excellent first-sacker, winning four consecutive NL gold gloves from 1974-77, just prior to Hernandez's run. Garvey is generally considered to be not quite as good as either Hernandez or Mattingly, particularly because he had a sub-par throwing arm and was less proficient at turning the double play. Hernandez and Mattingly have a distinct advantage in that department over Garvey, both being left-handed throwers, but the fact remains that first base, the least important defensive position on the field, was the only position that Garvey was capable of playing, despite not being limited to what positions he could play by his throwing hand. In my original discussion of Steve Garvey, the debate that prompted me to perform this analysis, I stated that I felt that Garvey was overrated defensively as a first-baseman. I am going to retract that statement and evaluate Garvey's defensive merits at face value, those being that he did win four gold gloves, and was probably only prevented from winning additional gold gloves by one of the greatest defensive first-basemen of all time.

Tony Perez is basically considered to have been an average defensive first-baseman. He never won a gold glove, but he certainly wasn't considered to be weak at fielding his position.

Now let's take a look at the defensive statistics that are available. First, I'm going to compare each player's fielding percentage and range factor to the league average at first base for his career. For a full explanation of the fielding statistics used here, see the Fielding Statistics Glossary at Baseball-Reference.com.

Player                      G    FP    lgFP    RF    lgRF
Steve Garvey         2059  .996  .992   9.65   8.51
Keith Hernandez     2014  .994  .992   9.73   8.51
Don Mattingly         1634  .996  .992   9.33   8.41
Tony Perez            1778  .992  .991   8.67   8.45

What do these limited statistics tell us? Essentially, Garvey and Mattingly rate tremendously in terms of fielding percentage, while Hernandez also rates well, and even Perez is above average. In terms of range, Hernandez rates the highest, but Garvey and Mattingly rate almost as well, and Perez, again, rates just above average. However, I'm not convinced that this method of evaluating a first-baseman's range is very effective, considering that it factors putouts into the numerator of the equation. What do putouts have to do with a first-baseman's range? Very little, in fact, with the possible exception of unassisted putouts, but these are difficult to capture. I'll have to examine this further if I have the time, but right now I'm not sure that it's worth it.

Overall, these statistics show us nothing that helps us distinguish between Garvey, Hernandez, and Mattingly. All three of these first-basemen back up their reputation with outstanding defensive statistics, although the value of one of these statistics is somewhat questionable. They all rate higher than Perez, who rates average to slightly above. I do plan on revisiting this defensive analysis, but right now I'm not convinced that statistics can really be used effectively to evaluate a first-baseman's defensive ability. I need to study Bill James' work on this subject a little further before I can draw any valuable conclusions.

In the meantime, I'm going to stick with the conventional wisdom, and my personal opinion, that Hernandez and Mattingly are two of the greatest defensive first-basemen of all-time, but that the difference between them and Garvey is not very significant considering the relative importance of the position that they play. Obviously, being a brilliant defensive first-baseman falls far short of being a brilliant defensive shortstop. Even the difference between their ability and that of Tony Perez may not be that statistically significant. I hope to shed more light on this subject later in this analysis, but I think it's time to begin a more in-depth look at offensive statistics.

I'm going to begin my comparison of these four first-basemen, who essentially represent four of the five best at this position among Hall of Fame inductees and eligible players who played the majority of their careers during my lifetime as a fan. I was born in 1967, and basically became a true baseball fan in 1974, so Tony Perez (1964-1986) just makes the cut, whereas Willie McCovey (1959-1980) doesn't. As I explained in my post of Jan. 11, I'm excluding Eddie Murray because he is a first ballot Hall of Famer and far superior to the other four.

To get started, I'm just going to look at the really basic, or what I like to call mainstream, offensive statistics. These categories are seasons played, games played, at bats, runs, hits, home runs, runs batted in, stolen bases, walks, batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage. Here's how they stack up:

Player                  Yrs    G     AB      R      H    HR   RBI   SB     BB   BA   OBP  SLG
Steve Garvey         19  2332  8835  1143  2599  272  1308   83    479  .294  .329  .446
Keith Hernandez     17  2088  7370  1124  2182  162  1071   98  1070  .296  .384  .436
Don Mattingly          14  1785  7003  1007  2153  222  1099   14   588  .307  .358  .471
Tony Perez             23  2777  9778  1272  2732  379  1652   49   925  .279  .341  .463

So, what do these statistics tell us? Well, most obviously, none of these guys had any speed, so I'm going to disregard stolen bases. Also, in almost every cumulative statistic, these players line up in order consistent with the length of their careers (Perez-Garvey-Hernandez-Mattingly), with the exception being that Mattingly rises above Hernandez in HR and RBI, despite placing last in seasons played, games played, and at bats. Also, Hernandez places first in walks, followed by Perez, Mattingly, and Garvey, but I'll get to that later.

Of course, longevity is a factor, and Perez deserves credit for ranking first among these players in R, H, HR, and RBI. But, I'm interested in far more than determining who played the longest and, as a result, being fooled into rating a player higher simply due to the length of his career. In fact, it's interesting to note that, despite the fact that Perez has clearly superior HR totals to Mattingly (379 to 222 total, 25.8 to 31.5 in AB/HR), Mattingly actually has a higher slugging percentage. This is in part due to Mattingly's higher batting average (.307 to .279), but this still suggests that maybe Perez's power is slightly overrated. However, it's difficult to argue with his career RBI total, which ranks 21st all-time, and places him behind only 17 other Hall of Famers and three players not yet eligible (Barry Bonds, Cal Ripken, Rafael Palmeiro).

Along those same lines, Garvey out-homers Hernandez 272 to 162 in career totals, and 32.5 to 45.5 in AB/HR, yet only edges him slightly in slugging (.446 to .436). This is despite the fact that they are virtually even in career batting average (.296 for Hernandez to Garvey's .294). Does this fact negate Garvey's perceived power advantage? We'll have to look closer before making that determination.

Anyway, I haven't even begun to look at any statistics in depth, and I haven't brought in any of my favorite non-mainstream stats yet. Oh yeah, and the subject of fielding has yet to come up, although I think we'll find that, despite the 24 gold gloves that Hernandez, Mattingly and Garvey can claim between them, the relative importance of the position they play will render this part of the analysis less meaningful than we might think.